Difused Surface Water: Reasonable Use Has Become the Common Enemy by Davis, Wendy B.
1Draft of August 5, 2003
Diffused Surface Water:  Reasonable Use Has Become the Common Enemy
By: Wendy B. Davis1
I. Introduction.
Diffused surface water, caused by precipitation, should be treated as a necessary asset 
to replenish aquifers used for drinking water, and not as waste to be disposed of by 
landowners.  Groundwater aquifers were created, and can only be replenished, by 
precipitation that is allowed to seep underground.2 Ninety-nine percent of the 
drinking water for people in rural areas of America comes from groundwater 
aquifers.3 These aquifers are in danger of being contaminated or depleted, which 
could result in severe water shortages very soon.4 Twenty percent of the people in the 
world, or 1.4 Billion people, do not have adequate clean water.5 A water crisis will be 
much more devastating than an energy crisis, because there are alternative energy 
sources, but no alternatives to clean water.6  Legislators have failed to enact a 
comprehensive system to regulate the use of aquifers, relying instead on a plethora of 
conflicting federal laws, inconsistent state laws, and town ordinances.7 Courts have 
dealt with precipitation, and the storm runoff that results, as a “common enemy” of 
landowners, something to be disposed of, rather than a valuable and necessary asset.8
  Severe droughts in the northeast in recent years have drawn attention to the 
problems caused by a lack of water.9 In 1999, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
1
 Associate Professor and Dean of Students, Appalachian School of Law, Grundy, Virginia. This article is 
dedicated to the memory of Dean L. Anthony Sutin and Prof. Tom Blackwell. Gratitude is acknowledged to 
Christie Saunders, Appalachian School of Law class of 2004, for excellent research and editting assistance.
2
 Benjamin R. Vance, “Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to Groundwater Protection,” 30 
U.S.F.L. Rev. 803, 804 (1996); see also http://www.groundwater.org/GWBasics/gwbasics.htm, last visited 
July 2, 2003  (“Groundwater begins as precipitation and soaks into the ground where it is stored in 
underground geological water systems called aquifers”); 
http://www.edwardsaquifer.net/charts.html#recharge, last visited July 2, 2003 (noting that 
precipitation is the only source of recharge for the Edwards Aquifer near San Antonio, Texas.)
3 http://www.groundwater.org/GWBasics/gwbasics.htm, last visited July 2, 2003; see also United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, “Citizen’s Guide to Ground-Water Protection, EPA 
440/6-90-004, at iii, April, 1990 (“Approximately one-fourth of all fresh water used inn the nation comes 
from groundwater”.)
4
 Benjamin R. Vance, “Total Aquifer Management: A New Approach to Groundwater Protection,” 30 
U.S.F.L. Rev. 803, 804 (1996); see also http://www.groundwater.org/GWBasics/gwbasics.htm, last visited 
July 2, 2003.
5
 Diane Raines Ward, Water Wars, at 2,  Riverhead Books, 2002.
6
 Id. at 4. 
7
 United States Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Water, “Citizen’s Guide to Ground-Water 
Protection, EPA 440/6-90-004, at iii, April, 1990 (“the responsibility for protecting a community’s ground-
water supplies rests substantially with the local community.”); see also Benjamin R. Vance, “Total Aquifer 
Management: A New Approach to Groundwater Protection,” 30 U.S.F.L. Rev. 803, 804- 805 (1996).  
8
 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, “The Legal Regulation of Diffused Surface Water,” 2 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 285, 
287 (1991).
9
 See Kenneth S. Gould, “An Introduction to Water Rights in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenges 
Move East,” 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 3, 3 (2002).
2Agency estimated the drinking water infrastructure needs for this country exceeded 
$150.9 Billion through 2018.10  One reason for the water shortage is the diversion of 
diffused surface water, which is thereby prevented from replenishing aquifers.11
Aquifers are large underground reservoirs, often underlying several states, which 
depend on rainwater, snowfall, and streams to replenish or recharge.12   Precipitation, 
in the form of rain or snow, is the source of virtually all freshwater available for 
drinking,13 yet the diversion of precipitation has been more of a focus than its 
collection or preservation.  Courts have traditionally been concerned with the 
damages to property caused by draining or diverting storm water runoff, rather than 
considering it a resource to be used as a water source.14 The common law regulating 
use of underground water and diversion of diffused surface water was developed 
before the science of hydrogeology could predict the impact of such laws on water 
supply.15 Hydrogeology is now better able to predict the location of  the watershed 
area where the precipitation recharges the aquifer, the rate of such recharge, and the 
impact of excessive withdrawals or overdraft.  
 Many of the largest aquifers in the U.S. are being depleted, which can cause salt 
water intrusion in aquifers near the ocean16 or subsidence, where the land surface 
sinks.17 Aquifers supply fifty percent of the U.S. population, ninety-nine percent of 
the U.S. rural population, and ninety-two percent of the population of Florida, with 
drinking water.18 Although aquifers straddle state lines, there is no comprehensive 
federal law to regulate the use of aquifers.19
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3When soil is covered with a building or paving, diffused surface water is prevented 
from following its natural course, and either a drought or flood can result. Wetlands 
surrounding rivers have been drained for development, so floodwaters now flood the 
buildings that replaced the wetlands.20 Precipitation cannot reach the aquifer if the 
land is covered with buildings or pavement.21 If more than 10-15% of the total 
surface area of any watershed (the aquifer recharge area) is covered with impervious 
cover, the rate and volume of runoff increases significantly.22 Stripping off vegetation 
and changing the grade of land can also cause silt and sediment to be deposited on 
neighboring lands or bodies of water.23 The increased runoff can cause flooding, as it 
did in May, 2002 in Southwest Virginia and Southern West Virginia.24
While some areas are suffering floods, other nearby regions were plagued with 
droughts. In the summer of 2002, Virginia faced a crisis when stream flows and 
ground water levels reached record lows.25 In 1999, Maryland experienced one of the 
worst droughts in its recorded history.26  At the same time, many areas were ravaged 
by local flooding caused by alterations in uphill property.27 It is hereby suggested that 
a more comprehensive, unified, and environmentally sound approach to diffused 
surface water would limit the fluctuations between flood and drought.  Municipalities 
should consider the impact on aquifers and properties at lower elevations when 
granting building permits. Green islands should be required to break up large areas of 
paving, allowing absorption of water into the soil and aquifers. 
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ambiguous, and the courts in a series of well injection cases came to differing conclusions.” 5 “Waters and 
Water Rights” §55.01, The Michie Company, 1991
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21
 Elizabeth D. Purdum, “Florida Waters; A Water Resource Manual from Florida’s Water Management 
Districts,” at 52, 84 http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us last visited July 9, 2003.
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http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/stormwater.htm, last visited June 12, 2003. 
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4There are currently four different standards applied by courts to determine liability 
when a property owner’s diversion of diffused surface water damages the property of 
an owner at a lower elevation. The existence of four standards creates confusion and a 
lack of predictability.  Landowners are unable to avoid liability because of the 
difficulty of predicting how a court will view the result of their actions. Additional 
confusion is caused by the different standards that are applied by courts to riparian 
rights of landowners who own property adjacent to streams and lakes, as well as 
ownership of groundwater, or rights to ocean coastlines.28 These types of water are 
inter-related; rainwater collects on the surface as diffused surface water, then flows 
into streams that flow into ponds or seep into aquifers.29 Another problem is that state 
law applies to surface water that knows no legal boundaries and may flow across state 
lines.30 For example, the Floridan aquifer underlies Alabama, Georgia, South 
Carolina, and Florida.31 Surface water flowing into the Floridan aquifer is subject to 
the Modified Common Enemy rule in Alabama and South Carolina, the Civil Law 
rule in Georgia, and the Reasonable Use rule in Florida.32 A single standard that takes 
into consideration the recharge of aquifers would be simpler to apply, result in greater 
fairness and predictability, and protect fresh drinking water.    
This article suggests standards to be applied by courts to determine what is reasonable 
use, and argues that all states should use one consistent standard for diffused surface 
water. It is also suggested that land development and water use must be treated as 
inter-dependent resources, and comprehensive federal legislation to protect 
groundwater should include regulation of diffused surface water.
The focus of this article is the right to divert or use surface water, liability for such 
diversion, and the problems caused by such diversion, including aquifer overdraft and 
depletion. This article does not address pollution of groundwater, which is a serious 
and life-threatening problem.33 This article will be limited to the quantity of surface 
water, with only a limited discussion of its impact on groundwater quality. This 
limitation is not intended to belittle the devastating problem of aquifer contamination, 
and other forms of water pollution. 
II. Definition of Diffused Surface Water
Diffused surface water has been defined as “the water from rains, springs, or melting 
snows which lies or flows on the surface of the earth but does not form part of a well-
defined body of water or a natural watercourse.  It does not lose its character as 
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5surface water merely because some of it may be absorbed by or soaked into the 
marshy or boggy ground where it collects.” 34 A natural watercourse, the water from 
which is excepted from the rules pertaining to diffused surface water, has been
defined as “[o]ne through which water regularly, though not constantly, flows along 
and through an identifiable and more or less permanent course, which includes among 
its features a bed where a natural stream of water runs.”35
III. Description of the Four Rules
Courts currently apply one of four different rules or standards to determine liability for 
diversion of diffused surface water: 
1. The Common Enemy Doctrine: all landowners can divert or block 
diffused surface water without liability
2. Modified Common Enemy: landowners are not liable for diverting water 
unless they block a natural drainway, collect water and channel it, or fail 
to exercise due care.
3. Civil Law or Natural Flow: a landowner who interferes with the natural 
flow of diffused surface water is liable.
4. Reasonable Use: landowners will not be liable so long as the resulting 
interference with the plaintiff’s land is not unreasonable. 
Several states impose even more complex schemes by statutes that use a different 
standard depending on whether the land is within city limits36, or has been artificially 
improved37, or if the water has reached a drainway.38  Some states impose different rules 
depending on whether the property is considered urban or rural.39
To illustrate the differences between the four rules, suppose A paves his entire lot, 
causing B, a landowner at lower elevation, to suffer a flooded basement. In response, B 
builds a flood- wall at his property line, causing the storm runoff from A’s lot to back up 
and pool on a portion of A’s lot. A and B bring actions against each other. 
1. Under the Common Enemy rule, A is not liable and B is not liable.
2. Under the Modified Common Enemy rule, A is not liable unless he acted in 
bad faith, but B is liable. 
3. Under the Civil Law rule, A is liable, B is not liable. 
4. Under the Reasonable Use rule, it is necessary to balance the benefits and 
harm to each party to determine liability.
34
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Minnesota49, Mississippi50, Missouri51, Nevada52, New Hampshire53, New Jersey54, North 
Carolina55,  North Dakota56, Ohio57,  Rhode Island58, Utah59, West Virginia60, and 
Wisconsin.61  Only Pennsylvania adheres to the Common Enemy rule without 
modification, and then only for land in urban areas.62 The Modified Common Enemy
Rule is used in the following twelve states and district: Alabama63, District of 
Columbia64, Washington65, Arkansas66, Virginia67, Kansas68, Indiana69, Maine70, 
Montana71, Nebraska72, Oklahoma73, and South Carolina74.  Civil Law or Natural Flow, 
40
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42
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46
 Association of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 58 P.3d 608, 617 (Hawaii 2002). 
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 Hall v. Wood, 443 S.2d 834, 840, n.1 (Miss. 1983); Martin v. Flanagan, 818 S.2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 
2002). .  
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 Heins Implement Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission, 859 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Mo. 
1993). 
52
 County of Clark v. Powers, 611 P.2d 1072 (Nev. 1980).
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S.E.2d 787 (1977).  
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 Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, v. Benson County Water Resource District, 618 
N.W.2d 155, 160 (N.D. 2000). 
57
 McGlashan v. Spade Rockledge Terrace Condo Development Corp., 402 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1980); 
Mays v. Moran, 1999 WL 181400 at *5 (Ohio App. 4 Dist. March 18, 1999). 
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 Zannini v. Arboretum Development, 1998 WL 1017288 (R.I. Super. July 7, 1988) (unpublished). 
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 Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985). 
60
 Graham V. Beverage, 566 S.E.2d 603, 612 (W. Va. 2002). 
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 Wisconsin v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wisc. 1974); Getka v. Lader, 238 N.W.2d 87 (Wisc. 1976). 
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So.2d 1170 (Ala. 2001); Easterling v. Awtrey Building Corp., 770 So.2d 606 (Ala. 1999). 
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 Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888, 890 (D.C. 1971). 
65
 Currens v. Sleek, 983 P.2d 626 (Wa. 1999). 
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 Michael v. Roberson, 1998 WL 712745 (Ark. App. Oct. 7, 1998). 
67
 Mullins v. Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110, 112 (Va. 1984). 
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 Williamson v. Hays, 64 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2003). 
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 Romine v. Gagle, 782 N.E.2d 369 (In. 2003). 
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 Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me 1978). 
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 Montana Dept. of Highways v. Feenan, 752 P.2d 182, 184 (Mont. 1988). 
7sometimes with a reasonableness requirement, is used the following fifteen states: 
Arizona75, Colorado76, Georgia77, Idaho78, Illinois79, Iowa80,  Louisiana81, Maryland82, 
Michigan83, New Mexico84, New York85, Oregon86, Tennessee87, Texas88, and South 
Dakota89 (with significant exceptions). Vermont uses nuisance language, similar to the 
Reasonable Use rule, but also uses trespass analysis to determine liability.90 Wyoming 
has not yet adopted any of the standard rules, relying instead on negligence theories.91
It is important to remember that under any of the four current rules for diffused surface 
water, a defendant who takes no action to alter the natural state of his land or the natural 
flow of storm runoff is not liable, even if the natural flow of storm runoff causes damage 
to the plaintiff’s land.92 This principal is illustrated in a dramatic case in Mississippi 
72
 Schott v. Hennings, 2000 WL 279898 (March 14, 2000); Nu-Dwarf Farms, Inc. v. Stratbucker Farms, 
Ltd., 470 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Neb. 1991). 
73
 Mattoon v. City of Norman, 617 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Ok. 1980). 
74
 Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 543 S.E.2d 563 (S.C. 2001). 
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 Gillespie Land & Irrigation Co. v. Gonzalez, 379 P.2d 135, 146 (Az. 1963) ( holding that one who alters 
a natural watercourse will be liable for its inability to carry away waters flowing into it); see also West 
Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Arizona Dept. of Water Resources, 26 P.3d 1171 (Az. 2001)(holding that 
landowner did not have the right to exclude others from using a riverbed to transport or store water). The 
courts’ analysis most closely resembles the Civil Law rule. 
76
 Bittersweet Farms, Inc., v. Zimbelman, 976 P.2d 326 (Colo. 1998); Hoff v. Ehrlich, 511 P.2d 523 (Colo. 
1973) (finding that dominant estate has easement in lower estate for drainage of surface water; the court 
does not use the term Civil Law, but the rule of law is similar). 
77
 McMillen Development Corp. v. Bull, 188 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1972); West v. CSX corp., 498 S.E.2d 67 
(Ga. App. 1998). 
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 Utter v. Gibbins, 48 P.3d 1250 (Idaho 2002). 
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 Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ill. 1990). 
80
 Grace Hodgson Trust v. McClannahan, 569 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1997); O’Tool v. Hathaway, 461 N.W.2d 
161 (Iowa 1990). 
81 Crr v. Oake Tree Apartments, 786 So.2d 230, 235 (La. 2001); Eubanks v. Bayou D’Arbonne Lake 
Watershed District, 742 So.2d 113, 118 (La. 1999). 
82
 Mark Downs, Inc., v. McCormick Properties, Inc., 441`A.2d 1119 (Md. App. 1982)(explaining that the 
civil law rule, while still applicable, has been modified by a reasonableness of use qualifier) ; Sainto v. 
Potter, 159 A.2d 632 (Md. 1960).
83
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 Walker v. L.G.Everist, Inc., 701 P.2d 382 (N.M. 1985). 
85
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not use the terms Civil Law or Natural Flow, the court found the defendant liable for artificially diverting 
surface waters onto plaintiff’s property.); see also Marzo v. Fast Trak Structures, Inc., 298 A.D.2d 909, 747 
N.Y.S. 2d 637 (N.Y. 2002); Lawrence Wolf, Inc. v. Kissing Bridge Corp., 288 A.D.2d 935, 733 N.Y.S.2d 
322 (N.Y. 2001). 
86
 Wellman v. Kelley, 252 P.2d 816, 821 (Oregon 1953); in accord Wimmer v. Compton, 560 P.2d 626 
(Oregon 1977).  
87
 Zollinger v. Carter, 837 S.W.2d 613 (Tenn. 1992); Genua v. Emory Associates, 2002 WL 753214 (Ct. 
App. Tenn. April 26, 2002).
88
 Jefferson County Drainage District No. 6 v. Lower Neches Valley Authority, 876 S.W.2d 940 (Texas 
1994).  
89
 Knodel v. Kassel Township, 581 N.W.2d 504 (S.D. 1998). 
90
 Canton v. Graniteville Fire District No. 4, 762 A.2d 808 (Vt. 2000). 
91
 Lee v. Brown, 357 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1960); Tompkins v. Byrtus, 267 P.2d 753 (Wyo. 1954). 
92
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8where three people were killed and five injured in an automobile accident when ice 
accumulated on a road.93 Although the defendant maintained roads on his property, it was 
otherwise unimproved, and therefore the court found that there was no affirmative act 
creating an artificial condition that could lead to liability.94
The required affirmative act by the defendant was evident in a Missouri case that 
demonstrated the devastating effects of surface water when a man drowned when his car 
became inoperable on a flooded highway.95 Adjoining landowners had constructed levees 
that rose ten feet about the grade of the highway to protect their crops.96 The man drove 
his car into the flooded section of highway, then exited his car after it stalled.97 He 
suffered a cardiac arrhythmia, fell into the puddle on the highway, and drowned.98 The 
court stated that life is valued over property, and in applying the reasonable use doctrine, 
diverting water from land to a highway may violate a reasonable duty of care.99
 As illustrated by these cases, and others discussed below, diffused surface water can 
create hazardous road conditions, pollution of lakes and streams, damage to spawning 
habitats, flooding of homes, damage to crops, and other harm. Nonetheless, diffused 
surface water is also a valuable asset, critical for the recharge of aquifers on which most 
Americans depend for drinking water. One problem with all four rules discussed above is 
the failure to consider the impact of the parties’ action on recharge of aquifers. In the 
illustration discussed earlier, where A paves his entire lot, A has prevented all 
precipitation from seeping through the soil, which could cause complete depletion of any 
underlying aquifer if A’s lot is large, or if other surrounding lot owners act similarly. 
Notwithstanding, in the majority of jurisdictions, if A could prove he acted in good faith 
and benefited from the paving, A would incur no liability for his actions. It is herein 
suggested that courts should give significant weight to the impact of the defendant’s 
actions on the recharge of aquifers.      
1.  Common Enemy Doctrine
One of the earliest cases to discuss the diversion of surface water was an 1865 
Massachusetts case that held each landowner had an unlimited legal privilege 
to divert or deflect surface water without regard to the consequences suffered 
by neighbors or landowners in lower elevations.100  This view was named the 
“common enemy” doctrine by a later New Jersey Court.101 “Surface water … 
is regarded as an outlaw and a common enemy against which anyone may 
93
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9defend himself, even though by so doing injury may result to others.” 102
Massachusetts later abandoned the Common Enemy doctrine in favor of the 
Reasonable Use rule.103 Although the Common Enemy rule is simple in 
application, and avoids litigation, it encourages contests between neighbors 
that could lead to a breach of the peace.104 This rule is also harmful to 
aquifers, permitting a landowner to divert all precipitation off his land, such as 
by paving the entire lot.  This could prevent absorption of the precipitation 
into the soil, thereby causing depletion of aquifers.  
Pennsylvania is one of the last states to still apply the Common Enemy 
doctrine, at least in urban areas. A pedestrian who slipped and fell on ice that 
was created by the defendant’s diversion of surface water onto an adjacent 
public alleyway was denied recovery.105 The court found that the Common 
Enemy doctrine applied in Pennsylvania urban areas, where a landowner is 
“liable for the effects of surface water running off his or her property only 
where he either (a) diverted the water from its natural channel by artificial 
means, or (b) unreasonably or unnecessarily increased the quantity or changed 
the quality of water discharged from his property.”106 Although the defendant 
had covered his property with macadam, thereby causing the runoff to flow 
into the alley, the court found this was not an artificial condition because there 
was no evidence that the grade of the land had changed.107 The court ignores 
the fact that the water would likely have been absorbed into the soil had not 
the artifical coverage of macadam been added by the defendant. 
2.  Modified Common Enemy
Nearly every jurisdiction that still follows the Common Enemy rule has 
adopted some exceptions or limitations to it. A recent Washington court108
recognized three usual exceptions:
A. Landowners may block the flow of diffused surface water, but are 
prohibited from inhibiting the flow of a watercourse or natural drainway.109
B. Landowners are prohibited from collecting water and channeling it onto 
land of a lower elevation or their neighbor’s land.110
C. Landowners who block the flow of diffused surface water must 
exercise due care or act reasonably, or in good faith, or with such care as to 
avoid unnecessary damage to the property of others.111
102
 Currens v. Sleek, 983 P.2d 626, 628 (Wa. 1999), quoting Cass v. Dicks, 44 P. 113, 113 (1896). 
103
 See Tucker v. Badoian, 384 N.E.2d 1195 (Mass. 1978); DeSanctis v. Lynn Water and Sewer 
Commission, 666 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1996). 
104
 Diffused Surface Water: Scourge or Boounty, 8 Nat. Resources J. 73, 78 (1968). 
105
 Fazio v. Fegley Oil Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 510 (Penn. 1998).
106
 Id. at 513. 
107
 Id. at 514.
108
 Currens v. Sleek, 983 P.2d 626 (Wa. 1999)
109




 Id.; in accord, Ballard v. Ace Wrecking Co., 289 A.2d 888, 890 (D.C. 1971). 
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The Washington court refused to abandon the Common Enemy doctrine, but 
adopted the third exception, holding “landowners who alter the flow of 
surface water on their property must exercise their rights with due care by 
acting in good faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of 
others.”112
Arkansas also follows the Modified Common Enemy approach, finding that 
the right to divert surface water must be exercised with “due care so as not to 
inflect injury on a neighboring landowner beyond what may be fairly 
necessary.”113 The court required the defendant to remove fill dirt and 
shrubbery that obstructed the drainage, causing pooling of water on the 
plaintiff’s property.114 An earlier Arkansas court similarly required the 
removal of an obstruction to drainage.115
Virginia courts also follow the Modified Common Enemy approach, defining 
the rule as, “surface water is a common enemy, and each landowner may fight 
it off as best he can, provided he does so reasonably and in good faith and not 
wantonly, unnecessarily, or carelessly.”116 In a 1984 case, the court ordered a 
defendant to remove a 125 foot long embankment that diverted surface water 
from a natural channel.117 The defendant constructed his home in the natural 
drainage area and the court found his actions to be unreasonable.118 A 1975 
Virginia court applying the same rule found no liability where the defendant 
erected a drainage system to channel water around his buildings, because the 
defendant did not act negligently, carelessly, or with malice, despite the three 
to eight inches of standing water left on plaintiff’s property.119 The difficulty 
in predicting results is obvious in these decisions, where the Virginia 
defendant in the 1975 case was not liable, but the 1984 Virginia defendant and 
the Arkansas defendant were liable.
A recent Kansas court found no liability where a subdivision storm sewer 
system dumped water on the plaintiff’s property at a higher velocity and 
increased flow.120 The court rejected the claim of negligence, finding that the
storm sewer system was constructed according to prevailing standards.121 The 
court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim of trespass, finding no evidence of 
pollution or evidence that the water changed its “ordinary and regular 
112
 983 P.2d at 630
113
 Michael v. Roberson, 1998 WL 712745 (Ark. App. Oct. 7, 1998) (quoting Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 
S.W.2d 265 (Ark. 1980). 
114
 1998 WL 712745 at *1,2. 
115
 Pirtle v. Opco, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 265 (Ark. 1980). 
116
 Mullins v. Greer, 311 S.E.2d 110,112 (Va. 1984) (quoting McCauley v. Phillips, 219 S.E.2d 854, 858 
(Va. 1975)). 
117




 McCauley v. Phillips, 219 S.E.2d 854 (Va. 1975). 
120
 Williamson v. Hays, 64 P.3d 364 (Kan. 2003).
121
 Id. at 372.
11
course.”122 Because the water followed its normal course through the 
plaintiff’s property, the increased velocity and volume of the water was not 
actionable by the plaintiff.123
An Indiana court awarded punitive and compensatory damages, as well as 
required the defendant to remove an obstruction, after the defendants filled a 
ditch with dirt.124 The court acknowledged that the Common Enemy doctrine 
would allow the defendants to divert or dam surface water, but found that the 
water in question flowed through a natural watercourse.125 The court defined 
“natural watercourse” as “one through which water regularly, though not 
constantly, flows along and through an identifiable and more or less 
permanent course, which includes among its features a bed where a natural 
stream of water runs.”126 Because the water flowed in a channel across the 
parties’ properties, the Common Enemy doctrine did not protect the 
defendants.127 The facts of this case are similar to the Arkansas case, with a 
similar result.128
In another case discussing the natural water course exception, a more recent 
Federal District Court applying Indiana law denied summary judgment to 
Wal-Mart, indicating that a factual issue had been raised as to whether the 
Common Enemy rule should apply where Wal-Mart had placed fill dirt and 
construction materials in a creek floodway.129 If the water causing the 
flooding was determined to be diffused surface water, then the Common 
Enemy doctrine would protect Wal-Mart.130 If, however, the water was 
determined to be a natural watercourse, a lower landowner cannot obstruct the 
watercourse to the detriment of the upper landowner.131 It is this type of 
conundrum that suggest a more unified approach to all water issues is 
necessary.
As the foregoing cases illustrate, it is difficult to predict when a court will 
determine that a defendant has been unreasonable or acted in bad faith. The 
difference between natural watercourse and diffused surface water is not 
always clear. The court’s analysis of the necessity of the harm to the plaintiff 
is not easy to predict. Also, courts fail to consider the extent of the impact on 
aquifer recharge caused by diversion of surface water in applying this rule. 
Notwithstanding these issues, the Modified Common Enemy rule remains 
more predictable than the Reasonable Use rule, as currently applied by courts. 
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3.  Civil Law or Natural Flow Rule
 Louisiana first adopted the natural flow doctrine, holding that the owner of 
land at lower elevations must accept the surface water that naturally flows 
onto his property, but the owner of higher elevations may do nothing to 
increase the flow.132 “A person who interferes with the natural flow of surface 
water so as to cause an invasion of another’s interests in the use and 
enjoyment of his land is subject to liability to the others.”133 Some courts used 
easement language, finding that landowners at higher elevations had an 
easement to discharge water on the lower elevations.134  Most courts add a 
limitation that the defendant must act with reasonable care.135
A New York court used classic Natural Flow analysis in granting summary 
judgment to a plaintiff where the record indicated that the defendants had 
“artificially diverted surface waters onto the plaintiffs’ property.”136 The one-
page opinion has no discussion of reasonableness or balancing of burdens. 
Similar to the New York court, a Tennessee court did not discuss whether the 
clearing by defendants’ was reasonably necessary or was significantly 
beneficial to defendants. The Court affirmed a jury award of $25,000 plus an 
injunction against defendants who cleared land of trees and other vegetation to 
develop a residential subdivision.137 The changes to defendants’ land caused 
flooding and damage to plaintiff’s home, located at a lower elevation.138 There 
was no balancing of the benefits, unlike the Illinois case discussed below139, 
and no reasonable care requirement, as in the Idaho case below.140
Idaho continues to follow the traditional civil law rule, finding “a servitude for 
natural drainage exists between adjoining landowners.”141 An Idaho court 
added a duty of reasonable care when the upper landowner operated a dam to 
divert water from its natural course into an artificial channel.142 The court 
considered the purposes for which the artificial channel and dam were created, 
as well as the  property’s use for recreation, fish and wildlife, flood control, 
and power generation.143
132
 Orleans Navigation Company v. City of New Orleans, 2 Mart. 214 (La. 1812). 
133
 Butler v. Bruno, 341 A. 2d at 738, quoting Kinyon & McClure, Interferences with Surface Waters, 24 
Minn. L. Rev. 891 (1940). 
134
 Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. 1990); Nininger v. Norwood, 72 Ala. 277, 282-83, 47 Am. Rep. 
412 (1882); see also Stanley v. Kinyon and Robert C. McClure, “Interferences with Surfaced Waters,” 24 
Minn. L. Rev. 891, 894 (1940). 
135
 Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Company, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (Idaho 1991). 
136
 Selter v. MCM Distributors, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 332, 749 N.Y.S.2d 94 (2002). 
137
 Genua v. Emory Associates, 2002 WL 753214 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 26, 2002. )
138
 Id. at *2.
139
 Dessen v. Jones, 551 N.E.2d 782, 786 (Ill. 1990).
140
 Utter v. Gibbins, 48 P.3d 1250 (Idaho 2002).
141
 Utter v. Gibbins, 48 P.3d 1250 (Idaho 2002). 
142
 Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Company, Ltd., 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (Idaho 1991). 
143
 Id. at 1230. 
13
Illinios also claims to use the Civil Law rule, with two exceptions: (1) “the 
good husbandry rule… permits the owner of dominant agricultural land to 
increase or alter the flow of water upon a servient estate if this is required for 
proper husbandry of the dominant land;144” and (2) an exception that pertains 
only to railroads.145 In addition to these two exceptions, there is a reasonable 
use qualification, where the dominant estate has increased the drainage on the 
servient estate, permitting “those defendants to change the drainage if the 
advantage to the dominant land sufficiently outweighed the damage to the use 
of the servient land.”146 In balancing these advantages, the court should 
consider “(1) the extent and nature of the harm; (2) the social value attached to 
the type of use or enjoyment interfered with; (3) the suitability of the 
particular use or enjoyment involved; (4) the burden on those harmed of 
avoiding harm; (5) the usefulness of the improvement to the street.”147 These 
qualifications cause difficulty in distinguishing the modified Civil Law rule 
from the Reasonable Use rule.  This qualification does not apply where the 
servient estate has obstructed the drainage flow from the dominant estate, 
where the traditional civil law rule applies, making the servient owner liable 
for blocking the drainage.148
The benefit of the traditional Civil Law rule is that aquifers can be recharged 
without interference from artificial drainage systems, and the potential 
liability may cause landowners to avoid excess paving and other impervious 
covering of the land. This rule is more predictable in application, but may 
result in a breach of the peace. The classic Civil Law rule, as applied in New 
York and Tennessee, is simple in application and protects aquifers. The 
modifications added by Idaho and Illinois make the rule less predictable in 
application, and result in greater impact on recharge of aquifers. 
 4. Reasonable Use Rule
Twenty- one states now follow the Reasonable Use rule, which requires that a 
property owner who diverts or block surface water must act reasonably, which 
is a fact to be determined by a jury.149 The jury must also balance the harm to 
the plaintiff’s land caused by the altered flow of surface water with the utility 
of the defendant’s use of his land.150  This balancing test is not required where 
the defendant is a municipality, because the municipality is “always free to 
limit its costs by acquiring drainage or other easements through exercise of the 
power of eminent domain.”151
144
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The trend toward the Reasonable Use rule is recent; as of 1940, only two 
states, New Hampshire and Minnesota, had adopted this rule, according to the 
seminal article on the subject by Kinyon and McClure.152 This trend may be 
due in part to the Kinyon and McClure article, which advocated for the 
Reasonable Use rule.153 Some courts acknowledge the lack of predictability in 
this rule, but find it encourages the development of land.154
This rule differs from the Modified Common Enemy rule, because the 
Modified Common Enemy rule requires some degree of negligence, malice, or 
lack of good faith for liability.155 The Reasonable Use rule focuses on the 
results of the defendant’s actions and the interference caused thereby with the 
plaintiff’s use of his land.156 The Reasonable Use rule uses analysis similar to 
a tort action in nuisance.157 The negligence of the defendant is not relevant, 
but rather unreasonable use by the defendant.158  The factors to be considered 
by courts applying this rule include the following, as first set forth in the 
Minnesota case of Enderson v. Kelehan:
“a. Is there a reasonable necessity for such draining?
b. Has reasonable care been taken to avoid unnecessary injury to the land 
receiving the water?
c. Does the benefit accruing to the land drained reasonably outweigh the 
resulting harm?
d. When practicable, is the diversion accomplished by reasonably 
improving the normal and natural system of draining, or if such a 
procedure is not practicable, has a reasonable and feasible artificial 
draining system been installed?”159
Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna, in his excellent 1991 article160, suggests that 
courts have considered eleven factors to determine whether an alteration of 
natural drainage was reasonable:
“(1) The injury to neighboring lands;
(2) The benefit to the drained land;
(3) The burden on either party of ameliorating the injury;
(4) The extent of the change to the drainage system;
(5) The necessity for changing the drainage system;
(6) The motive for changing the drainage system;
152
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(7)  The foreseeability of impact on neighboring lands;
(8) Justice and other social values;
(9) The location of the lands;
(10) The extent and intended effect of any public authorization;
(11) The protection of existing values.”161
Unfortunately, none of the above factors considers the impact that diversion of 
surface water has on recharge of aquifers. Without consideration of aquifer 
recharge, we are endangering the drinking water supply of this nation.  If all 
courts used the same rule and factors, consistency and predictability would be 
enhanced. Few of the courts that currently apply the Reasonable Use rule use 
either group of factors noted above.   
Alaska follows the Reasonable Use rule, but made no attempt to analyze the 
factors listed above.162 The court stated that the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s actions must be determined by the trial judge.163
Delaware courts have developed a different set of factors to be considered in 
applying the Reasonable Use rule: “the amount of harm caused, the 
foreseeability of such harm, the utility of the upland owners’ use of their land 
as contrasted with the degree of harm resulting from such use, and whether the 
upland owners’ conduct is unreasonable, reckless, or negligent.”164
California claims to use a modified version of the Civil Law rule, requiring 
that each property owner must leave the natural flow of surface water 
undisturbed; however the modifications make the rule the same as the 
Reasonable Use rule.165 A recent California court noted that the Civil Law 
rule has the advantage of predictability, but then went on to say, “we cannot 
permit certainty of liability to be an excuse for tolerating unreasonable 
conduct by any landowners.”166 The court determined the reasonableness of 
the conduct by weighing the utility of the defendant’s use with the gravity of 
the harm to the plaintiff, and decided that if the harm to the plaintiff was 
unreasonably severe, then the defendant must be liable.167 This court has 
added a significant level of unpredictability to California water law.
Minnesota and Kentucky courts have adopted the reasonable use rule, as well 
as the four Enderson factors.168 The Kentucky court relied heavily on nuisance 
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anaysis, balancing the reasonableness of the defendant’s use of his property 
with the extent of harm to the plaintiff’s property.169 A dissent noted the 
confusion and consternation caused by the change from the well- settled Civil 
Law doctrine to the Reasonable Use test.170
A Mississippi decision is unusual because of the court’s sensitivity to 
ecological and environmental impact.171 The defendant had stripped off all 
vegetation in preparation of selling the property to a department store.172 The 
deal fell through, and the defendant left the stripped parcel as is, without 
erosion prevention.173 Eighty to one hundred tons of silt, sediment, and other 
pollutants were washed into a nearby lake per year, creating a mud bar and 
destroying spawning habitat. 174 The court found that the defendant did not do 
what was reasonable to minimize the foreseeable damage, and therefore 
issued an injunction requiring the defendant to remove all silt and prevent 
further pollution of the lake.175
Missouri courts have followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 833 
(1977) suggestion that interfering with the flow of surface water is to be 
analyzed as a form of nuisance.176 The court found a cause of action was 
stated by plaintiffs whose land was flooded repeatedly after a highway bypass 
project was completed with a culvert that was designed to divert only normal 
flow, not common overflows.177 A more recent Missouri court found that a 
nuisance claim was stated, where the plaintiff claimed that the towns had 
negligently designed storm drainage and sewer systems that caused repeated 
flooding of their downhill property. 178 The court found that common law 
actions of negligence and trespass were made obsolete by the Reasonable Use 
rule, which requires that nuisance be proven, and remanded the case for such a 
determination.179
A New Jersey court illustrated the lack of predictability in outcome by finding 
that hurricanes are reasonably foreseeable, enjoining a town from the 
continuing nuisance of an eighteen inch outfall pipe releasing water onto a 
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hundred acres, including three hundred feet of pipe.181 The court mentioned 
no factors in concluding the impact was unreasonable.
Ohio courts use a different set of factors to determine reasonable use, partially 
adopted from the Restatement Second of Torts: (1) the foreseeability and 
gravity of plaintiff’s harm; (2) the utility of defendant’s development; and (3) 
the practicality of  preventing the harm to the plaintiff.182
A Rhode Island plaintiff was successful in obtaining an order requiring the 
defendant condominium developer to construct a more effective drainage 
system.183 The court adopted the four Enderson factors listed above in 
applying the reasonable use rule.184  The plaintiff suffered water in his 
basement, cracked cement walkways, and stains and mold on basement 
walls.185 The Defendant had constructed a street and a duplex condominium 
project with only a timber wall to halt the drainage from roofs and 
pavement.186 Prior to the defendant’s alterations, the runoff directed at 
plaintiff’s property was an average of 35% of the post alteration runoff, and 
when the surface was frozen, the pre-alteration flow was 25% less.187 The 
court found that the plaintiff should have either made a reasonable 
improvement to the natural drainage system or installed an artificial system to 
avoid liability.188 The court found the defendant’s actions to be a nuisance, 
and awarded both injunctive relief and compensatory damages.189
In another case the illustrates the lack of predictability and general unfairness 
of the Reasonable Use rule, a Massachusetts court found that the defendant, a 
municipal water commission, was not liable, even though a jury found it to be 
negligent, in flooding the plaintiff’s land.190 The Defendant would only be 
liable if its interference with the flow of surface waters was found by a jury to 
be unreasonable.191 The defendant escaped liability when the jury found they 
were negligent but that their use was not unreasonable.192
In one of the few areas where West Virginia law differs from Virginia law, 
West Virginia follows the reasonable use rule.193 A West Virginia Court 
denied summary judgment to the defendant, finding that a jury must determine 
whether the drainage system for the defendant’s new housing development, 
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which drained the runoff from two acres of land on to plaintiff’s property, was 
reasonable.194
IV. Problems with the Reasonable Use Standard
The most commonly stated problems with the Reasonable Use rule are the lack of 
certainty and predictability.195  Because states apply such different standards, and 
there is no consistency even within jurisdictions as to how the factors are weighed 
and balanced, landowners cannot predict how a court will decide. As discussed 
above, a defendant who is negligent may not be liable in Massachusetts196,  and a 
defendant may be required to predict the effects of hurricanes in New Jersey.197
Some courts have stated that the reasonable exception to the Modified Common 
Enemy rule and the Reasonable Use rule are identical in application; “the so-called 
exception … devour[s] the rule.”198  A Missouri Court referred to it as a “distinction 
without a difference.”199  These courts have failed to distinguish the different focus, 
where the Modified Common Enemy rule imposes liability for negligence by the 
defendant while the Reasonable Use rule imposes liability if the action results in a 
nuisance.  This failure highlights the problem with the multiple rules and difficulty in 
prediction of outcome.
A more important problem with the Reasonable Use rule is the failure to consider the 
impact of diversion of surface water on aquifer recharge. Among the various factors 
considered by courts, no court has considered whether the defendant’s property is 
located in a watershed, or the impact of the defendant’s actions on the recharge of the 
aquifer. Landowners in an aquifer recharge area should be held to a higher standard, 
prohibited from diverting surface waters in such a way that inhibits recharge of the 
aquifer. Courts should consider the impact of paving or impervious cover, which not 
only increases the flow of surface water, thereby increasing the potential harm to 
other property, but prohibits aquifer recharge.200
V. Environmental Impact
Alterations to the surface, grade, irrigation, or vegetation of land, or construction of 
improvements, all impact the storm runoff, and thereby affect the quantity and quality 
of recharge of aquifers. Merely tilling the land changes “the infiltration and runoff 
characteristics of the land surface, which affects recharge to groundwater, delivery of 
water and sediment to surface-water bodies, and evapotranspiration.”201 Surface 
water, the result of rain or snow, is directly related to the quantity and quality of 
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groundwater aquifers; the two water sources should not be treated as separate assets 
by the law.
Aquifer water quality is affected by development of surface water property.  Drinking 
water aquifers become contaminated by ammonium, a major component of fertilizer 
and manure, which dissolves in the precipitation and enters the groundwater.202 In 
more urban areas, sewage treatment plants, industrial facilities, septic tanks, and 
stormwater drains carry contaminants through the surface water to aquifers.203 More 
rapid drainage caused by artificial drainage systems results in less time in contact 
with deep subsurface materials, which reduces the buffering of acid precipitation, 
resulting in higher acidity in lakes and streams.204 Lowering the level of water in 
aquifers caused by development can result in salt water intrusion near the coast, 
where sea water moves into the aquifer or rises up from the bottom of the aquifer and 
contaminates the fresh water.205
The layers of soil and gravel through which the surface water and precipitation must 
pass were once thought to act as filters to protect the purity of the water reaching the 
aquifer.206 It has now become painfully obvious that impurities pass through this 
filtration: in 1990 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported “[b]etween 
1971 and 1985, ground-water related disease outbreaks, with 52,181 associated 
illnesses, were reported…. About 10 percent of all ground-water public water supply 
systems are in violation of drinking water standards for biological contamination. In 
addition, approximately 74 pesticides, a number of which are known carcinogens, 
have been detected in the ground water of 38 states.”207
The quantity of aquifer recharge is also affected by development. Before land is used 
for agriculture or construction, excess water is often drained from the land.208 In 
Iowa, more than 90 percent of the original wetland areas have been destroyed in this 
manner; in the upper Midwest, nearly 50 percent have been destroyed.209 These 
changes impact the amount of surface water available to recharge aquifers.210
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Construction of improvements and paving land necessitates construction of drainage 
systems to carry off the storm water that is no longer able to seep into the soil. “More 
efficient runoff caused by drainage systems results in decreased recharge to ground 
water and greater contribution to flooding.”211 Removing vegetation also increases 
storm runoff and soil erosion, thereby decreasing infiltration to ground water.212
Statistics proving the measured impact on aquifers when acres of land are covered 
with paving or buildings are not available. The exact quantity of recharge from 
streams fed by precipitation “remains highly uncertain,” although “promising new 
methods of estimating ground-water recharge…are being developed.”213 Because we 
are unable at this time to measure the damage to aquifers caused by development, we 
must be cautious to ensure that irreversible damage is prevented.  
Global warming may also negatively impact the quantity and quality of groundwater 
aquifers, but “little attention has been directed at determining the effects of climate 
change” and the effects on the hydrologic cycle “can only be described with great 
uncertainty.”214  Because of the uncertainty of impact, it is imperative that we take 
reasonable steps to protect aquifers now before global warming exacerbates the 
problem.215
VI. Problems with Local Ordinances
Because there is no comprehensive federal legislation of aquifer use, control of 
aquifers is primarily controlled by local town ordinances.216 Numerous federal 
laws are intended to protect the quality of the groundwater, but none address the 
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quantity.217  Some towns designate the aquifer recharge area, or watershed, and 
impose additional restrictions on these areas, however the determination of the 
exact location of the watershed is not an exact science. Town ordinances are 
inconsistent, and many are not effective at ensuring that precipitation is allowed 
to recharge aquifers.  For example, one of the better aquifer conservation district 
ordinances was enacted by the Town of Sanbornton, New Hampshire in 1978.218
The ordinance provides that “no more than 10 percent of a lot or tract shall be 
covered with pavement, roofing, or other material impervious to water.” The lot 
size minimum is six acres.
In contrast, the Falmouth, Massachusetts, Water Resource Protection District 
ordinance219 provides a minimum lot size of only 80,000 square feet and permits 
lot coverage of up to 20% for residential uses and 40% for non-residential uses. 
The aquifer protection district ordinances for the towns of Hadley, 
Massachusetts220, Bedford, New York221, and Richmond, Rhode Island222 do not 
contain minimum lot sizes, have no lot coverage maximum percentages, and 
permit commercial uses. Most of the local zoning ordinances reviewed made an 
attempt to protect the water quality, by limiting septic disposal and use of 
hazardous materials, but were inadequate to regulate the quantity of surface water 
available to recharge the aquifer.
Instead of depending on each town to impose effective ordinances to protect 
aquifers, a more unified approach is needed. Courts should impose a single 
standard for diffused surface water, rather than the four different standards 
discussed above.  Additionally, courts should consider the impact on aquifers as 
an important factor in determining liability of defendants for diverting surface 
water. These changes would be an important first step toward protecting the 
quantity of available aquifer drinking water.  Federal legislation regulating the use 
of aquifer water would be a logical next step. 
VII. Suggested Standards to be Used for Reasonable Use
Courts should adopt standard factors to be considered when applying the Reasonable 
Use rule, or any of the other rules for diffused surface water.  Water does not respect 
state borders, therefore inconsistent rules for adjoining states makes no sense. The 
following are suggested factors that would increase predictability and protect the 
nations’ aquifers. Defendants should be liable for diversion of diffused surface water 
unless:
(1) No more than 10% of the defendant’s lot is covered with 
impervious cover, including structures or paving.
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(2) Any artificial drainage system diverts precipitation towards a 
natural watercourse or an area with sufficient vegetation to allow 
absorption by the soil;
(3) The diversion of surface water does not impair the total amount 
of water available to recharge the nearest aquifer;
(4) Any increase in quantity or velocity of water draining on 
adjoining or lower elevation properties as a result of the 
defendant’s diversion causes no foreseeable harm to people,  
structures or crops, considering a 20 year flood. 
The factors above do not take into account the need to encourage development of real 
estate. Development is its own reward, and is no longer a primary goal in  most 
communities, which are now more concerned with preserving their remaining 
undeveloped land.  The protection of the water supply is another reason for 
communities to preserve such undeveloped land. 
VIII. Suggested Legislation to Protect Aquifers
It has been suggested that federal legislation should regulate the management of 
aquifers.223 The author supports this suggestion. Many of the nation’s largest aquifers 
cross state lines, making state laws ineffective for management. Some states are more 
ecologically aware than others, and a consistent and comprehensive plan is necessary 
to protect these valuable assets. Aquifer management must include management of 
diversion of diffused surface water. The hydrologic cycle dictates that precipitation 
the collects as diffused surface water will eventually end up in an aquifer; the 
interrelationship between these water sources necessitates that comprehensive 
management consider all forms of water, rather than the current separate legal 
treatment of diffused surface water, groundwater, and riparian rights.224
Florida has more comprehensive water legislation than most states, because Florida 
has more ground water in aquifers than any other state.225 The 1972 Florida Water 
Resources Act,226 established five water management districts which were assigned 
the responsibility for water management, including quantity, quality, and flood 
protection.227  Prior to the enactment of this legislation, areas of Florida were 
experiencing saltwater intrusion, diminished spring flow, dried out marshes, and 
disappearing lakes, caused by withdrawing more groundwater from aquifers than 
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could be recharged by precipitation.228   Central Florida was plagued  with sink holes 
caused by reductions in the water table.229
The Floridan Aquifer, which underlies all of Florida and parts of Alabama, Georgia, 
and South Carolina, has experienced increased pumping in recent decades resulting in 
lower water levels.230  Nearly 700 sinkholes appeared in 1998 when the earth above 
the aquifer collapsed from the loss of water.231 Water levels in the Hawthorn and 
Sandstone aquifers declined by about one foot per year between 1974 and 1998.232
“Saltwater contamination has been observed in all of the principal water-supply 
aquifers of southern Florida.”233  The state now acknowledges that “[l]imiting 
intensive development in high recharge areas is critical for maintaining water 
supplies; water cannot soak through pavement.”234 The water management districts 
have also established a program of water conservation, resulting in a seven percent 
decrease of groundwater withdrawals between 1990 and 1995, even though the 
population increased nine percent. 235   The management in place in Florida should be 
used as an example for other states, and the federal legislators, in managing aquifers.
IX. Conclusion
The existence of four different standards to impose liability for diversion of diffused 
surface water is burdensome, creates confusion and a lack of certainty and 
predictability, and is fundamentally unfair. These four standards are also ineffective 
in protecting the recharge of aquifers. A single standard should be adopted by all 
courts, with a significant amount of weight given to the impact of the defendant’s 
actions on the recharge of aquifers. 
Comprehensive federal legislation is needed to protect aquifers. Zoning ordinances, 
subdivision ordinances, site plan review, design standards, operating standards, 
source prohibitions, land sales, public education, groundwater monitoring, household 
hazardous waste collection, and water conservation are all necessary tools to manage 
and protect the supply of adequate and clean drinking water. Clean drinking water is 
no longer an abundant renewable resource and must be preserved and protected.  
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